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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,

Case No. 20020002-SC

v.
ERIC JARVIS WARREN,
Defendant/Respondent
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
THE ISSUE ON CERTIORARI IS NOT WHETHER A WEAPONS
FRISK IS AUTOMATICALLY JUSTIFIED PURSUANT TO A
TRAFFIC STOP, BUT WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ALL
TRAFFIC STOPS ARE INHERENTLY DANGEROUS
Defendant repeatedly asserts that "it would be patently unreasonable to adopt a
rule that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous and therefore afriskis always justified
in those situations" See Resp. Br. at 7,14-15,18 (emphasis added). The State does not
ask for such a rule, nor is that the issue before the Court. The issue framed in the State's
Petition for Certiorari was as follows:
In determining whether the officer who stopped defendant's car for minor
traffic violations had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant, did the court
of appeals properly ignore this Court's recognition that traffic stops are
inherently dangerous?
Cert. Pet. at 1.

The State has not and does not now argue that a weapons frisk is automatically
justified by virtue of the dangers inherent in all traffic stops, but rather that reviewing
courts cannot dismiss this critical and relevant factor in reviewing the totality of the
circumstances confronting an officer conducting a traffic stop. As set out in the Brief of
Petitioner, pp. 8-13, the court of appeals' refusal to consider the circumstances
surrounding the instant traffic stop in their totality, including the inherent dangerousness
of traffic stops was the basis for the court's erroneous determination that the instant frisk
was unjustified. See Pet Br. at 7-14. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,122
S.Ct. 744, 750 (2002) (reaffirming that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) "precludes" a
"divide-and-conquer analysis1' in evaluating reasonable suspicion).
DEFENDANT'S OBSERVATION THAT ANY GIVEN TRAFFIC
STOP MAY AS LIKELY INVOLVE A NON-VIOLENT AS A
VIOLENT OFFENDER IS IRRELEVANT
Defendant urges this Court to affirm because he believes the court of appeals
"properly noted that 'lesser traffic offenses' are not suggestive of weapons/" Resp. Br. at
11,21 (quoting State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, f 16 n.4, 37 P.3d 270). As set out in
the State's Brief of Petitioner, pp. 7-8, defendant's—and the court of appeals' view—is at
odds with this Court's recognition that "concerns relating to officer safety" during traffic
stops are "inherent." State v. James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 n.3, 13 P.3d 576 (citing Knowles v.
Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-118 (1998) and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-110
(1977)). See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (recognizing "that the
possibility of a violent encounter stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist
2

stopped for a speeding violation, butfromthe fact that evidence of a more serious crime
might be uncovered during the stop"). Indeed, as this Court recognized, "the safety
concerns guiding the Supreme Court's decision in Mimms do not depend on any
particular showing that an officer was at heightened risk due to the unique circumstances
of a given automobile stop[.]" James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 n.3. See also Knowles, 525 U.S.
at 117 (recognizing that the concern for officer safety does not abate "in the case of a
routine traffic stop"). Defendant's suggestion that any given traffic stop may as likely
involve a non-violent as a violent offender is thus irrelevant. Resp. Br. at 11.
Moreover, contrary to defendant's further suggestion, the traffic stops in Mimms,
Wilson and James are not meaningfully distinguished on the ground that they involved
lesser intrusions than a protectivefrisk,i.e., ordering and assisting drivers and passengers
from stopped vehicles. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 107; Wilson, 519 U.S. at 411; James,
2001 UT 364, ffl 3,11. Resp. Br. at 16-18. This distinction may have significance if the
State was equating the danger inherent in traffic stops with automatic justification to frisk,
but it is of no consequence in the absence of such an argument. Rather, the real
importance of Mimms, Wilson, and James is that they recognize the inherent danger in
traffic stops regardless of whether the traffic stop involves a minor or a major violation.
James, 2000 UT 80, J 10 n.3. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 107 (Mimms was stopped for "an
expired license plate"); Wilson, 519 U.S. at 410 (Wilson was stopped for traveling 64
m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone and "no regular license tag"); James, 2000 UT 80, ^j 11 (James
was detained for reckless driving). Defendant essentially acknowledges as much. Resp.
3

Br. at 19. ("At most, [Mimms, Wilson and James] set forth the proposition that safety
concerns inhere in traffic stops, and for that reason the limited intrusions discussed in
those cases are appropriate."). The problem here is that the court of appeals refiised to
recognize that the potential for danger inheres in the fact of the traffic stop itself,
regardless of the egregiousness of the specific violation. See Warren, 2001 UT 346, ff
15-16 n.4. See Pet Br. at 11.
The Tenth Circuit recently emphasized the morbid reality confronting police
conducting a routine traffic stop:
The terrifying truth is that officers face a very real risk of being assaulted
with a dangerous weapon each time they stop a vehicle. The officer
typically has to leave his vehicle, thereby exposing himself to potential
assault by a motorist. The officer approaches the vehicle not knowing who
the motorist is or what the motorists's intentions might be. It is precisely
during such an exposed stop that the courts have been willing to give the
officers 'wide latitude/ to discern the threat the motorist may pose to
officer safety.
An officer in today's reality has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his
or her life every time a motorist is stopped. Every traffic stop, after all, is a
confrontation. The motorist must suspend his plans and anticipates
receiving a fine and perhaps even a jail term. That expectation becomes
even more real when the motorist or a passenger knows there are
outstanding warrants or current criminal activity that may be discovered
during the course of the stop. Resort to a loaded weapon is an increasingly
plausible option for many such motorists to escape those consequences, and
the officer, when stopping a car on a routine traffic stop never knows in
advance which motorists have that option by virtue of possession of a
loaded weapon in the car.
United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215,1223 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
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Here, in addition to the inherent danger in the fact of the traffic stop itself, Officer
Swensen observed conduct immediately prior to the traffic violations which in his
experience reasonably suggested defendant was involved in a drug or prostitution offense
with another individual. Following the traffic stop, defendant lied about the invalidity of
his license (R84). Given these circumstances and the other objective factors emphasized
by the trial court including, at that unusually early hour—the isolated downtown location,
the fact that Officer Swensen was alone, and that he needed to impound defendant's
Cadillac, attempting to perform a protective frisk before proceeding with the impound
was eminently reasonable (id.). See Pet. Br. at 10-11.
In sum, the State is not asking that the well-established rule mat police may order
drivers and passengers from their vehicles be extended to encompass an automatic
protective frisk. Rather, the State is asking this Court to instruct lower courts that the
danger inherent in all traffic stops must be considered as part of the totality of the
circumstances test in any evaluation of the reasonableness of an officer's decision to frisk
incident to a traffic stop.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT AN
OFFICER SUBJECTIVELY FEAR A SUSPECT BEFORE A
PROTECTIVE FRISK IS JUSTIFIED
Defendant also asserts that the court of appeals decision should be affirmed on
certiorari "because Officer Swensen himself testified that he did not think that [defendant]
was armed and dangerous and that he onlyfrisksas a matter of routine." Resp. Br. at 10.
Defendant claims that "if Officer Swensen himself did not believe that [defendant] was
5

armed and dangerous, then the reasonable particularized suspicion requirement which lies
at the heart of Terry and the Fourth Amendment is not present." Resp. Br. at 10. Contrary
to defendant's suggestion, neither Terry nor the Fourth Amendment require that police
subjectively fear a suspect before a protective frisk is warranted.
Rather, in assessing the reasonableness of a weapons frisk, "it is imperative that
the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer
at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the action taken was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added).
See also State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656,659 (Utah 1985) ("It is not essential that an officer
actually have been in fear.")* Under this objective standard, "[t]he officer need not be
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent
man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others
was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. "[D]ue weight must also be given[]... to the
specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his
experience." Id. See also Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 751 (2002) (recognizing that totality of
circumstances review "allows officers to draw on their experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information
available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person"') (quotation omitted).
"That one officer is braver (or more foolhardy) than another, and therefore not
subjectively concerned for his or safety, should not deprive that particular officer of a
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right to protect his or her safety. Even the brave officer should be allowed to minimize
the ever-present risk of being attacked or killed." Holt, 264 F.3d at 1225-1226.
While Officer Swensen expressed no subjective fear of defendant, he did articulate
an objective officer safety concern (see R129:9). As noted previously, the trial court also
identified several objective factors justifying the frisk, including the unusually early hour,
the downtown location (no residences or open business), defendant's and his companion's
suspicious behavior prior to the stop (suggesting a possible drug or prostitution offense),
the fact that Officer Swensen was alone, defendant's lie about the status of his license,
and the need to impound defendant's vehicle (See R84). See Pet. Br. at 10-11.
In evaluating the reasonableness of thefrisk,the court of appeals' purported to
recognize that "'[i]t is not essential that an officer actually have been in fear' to perform a
Terry frisk." That recognition amounted to mere lip service when the court of appeals
summarily concluded that "[t]he fact that Officer Swensen candidly admitted at the
suppression hearing that he did not believe Warren was armed at the time he decided to
frisk him clearly takes Officer Swensen's actions outside of Terry's limited justification
for warrantless searches." Warren, 2001 UT App 346, t l 14,16. Essentially ignoring the
trial court'sfindings,the court of appeals reversed on the ground that Officer Swensen's
subjective impression was alone determinative. Id. Applying the court of appeals'
reasoning, officers who have no subjective fear of a suspect, but who do have objective
safety concerns will never be able to justify a protective frisk. Warren, 2001 UT App
346,116. Such a result is contrary to Terry, and to James in particular (where the officer
7

similarly expressed no subjective safety concern), and thus presents no compelling
ground for affirming the court of appeals' flawed analysis. Id. at f 10 n.3.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals' conflicting and inadequate analysis should be reversed and
remanded.1
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on 3£t>ctober2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
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'As set out in Pet. Br. at 14 n.3, remand is necessary because the court of appeals
did not address the issue of whether the officer's brief questioning unduly prolonged the
traffic stop prior to the frisk. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346,116 n.5.
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